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Abstract 
 
In this paper we test the HRM/union substitution hypothesis that human resource management (HRM) practices 
act as a substitute for unionization. We use British workplace data between 1980 and 1998 which allows us to 
examine for the first time whether increased HRM incidence has coincided with union decline.  
 First, we compare changes over time in the incidence of HRM practices across union and non-union 
sectors, finding little cross-time difference occurring between sectors. Second, we ask whether newer 
workplaces (strongly shown by other research as more likely to be non-union) have experienced differentially 
faster HRM incidence; we are unable to find much evidence in support of this. Third, longitudinal changes also 
fail to pick up any evidence of faster union decline in workplaces or industries with faster take up of HRM 
practices.  We find no evidence of HRM substitution operating in the hypothesised way of it replacing unions 
and conclude that increased HRM incidence does not seem to be an important factor underpinning union decline 
in Britain. 
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Looking for HRM/Union Substitution: 
Evidence from British Workplaces 
Stephen Machin and Stephen Wood 
 
 
 
 
 1.  Introduction
 
 
The decline of trade unionism has been a feature of most countries in recent 
years (Verma, et al, 2002) and the subject of study of a large body of research. Union 
decline has been especially strong in Britain over the last twenty-five years.  In the 
late 1970s over 13 million people – or around 58 percent of employees - were trade 
union members, and over 70 percent of employees’ wages were set by collective 
bargaining. Since reaching its peak in 1979, unionization (however measured) has 
fallen year on year so that in 2003 less than 30 percent of workers are members of a 
trade union. 
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Coinciding with the decline in trade unionism has been an increase in the use 
of human relations practices and new forms of work organisation. These are often 
subsumed under labels such as high involvement, high commitment and high 
performance management, or simply human resource management.  For convenience 
we shall follow Fiorito (2001), the major US writer on union substitution, and use the 
term human resource management (HRM).  The increased adoption of HRM practices 
has been presented, particularly in the prescriptive management literature, as 
providing the basis for a new win-win relationship between workers and managers. It 
is argued that they offer management the prospect of improved performance whilst 
simultaneously improving workers’ job satisfaction, security and perhaps pay. 
The increasing adoption of the term high performance methods, even in the 
industrial relations literature, implies an acceptance of the validity of this chain of 
argument.  If it is indeed the case that these modern HRM methods do enhance the 
satisfaction of workers, they might be expected to reduce the demand for trade unions.  
This possibility forms the basis of what has become known as the HRM/substitution 
explanation of union decline.  The argument is that unions may become redundant in 
the eyes of workers (and employers) because of ‘the effects that positive employer 
practices… have in reducing the causes (author’s italics) of unionism i.e. worker 
dissatisfaction’ (Fiorito, 2001: 335).   
This paper explores empirically whether HRM/union substitution has been a 
major factor in the decline of trade unionism in Britain. It asks whether there is indeed 
a link between the rise of HRM and declining trade unionism in British workplaces. 
To do so we are able to draw upon rich data on workplaces over time from the British 
Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations series of data from 1980, 1984, 1990 and 
1998. 
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 We start by examining whether, in the era of union decline, HRM practices 
permeated into non-union workplaces at a faster rate than they did in unionized 
workplaces. If they did this would suggest that HRM practices do increasingly 
provide a voice for workers in non-union environments, and may well make trade 
unions anachronisms in the workplace. In other words, in this world of HRM, workers 
do not need union representation in their workplace to ensure that grievance 
procedures, health and safety arrangements, and other forms of involvement are there 
for them if required.   
Moreover, were a more rapid implementation of HRM into non-union 
workplaces discovered, it would also question the notion expressed by some that 
HRM practices and unions are complementary. Moreover, and were it a long-term 
trend, it would severely question the ‘mutual gains’ (Kochan and Osterman, 1994) 
argument that HRM’s performance effects will be enhanced when unions are present, 
even if HRM is substituting for unions.  
It could, however, be the case that a correlation between non-unionism and 
HRM reflects the fact that HRM practices are newer than traditional unions and as 
such are more likely to be located in newer workplaces; as we know from other 
studies, newer workplaces in Britain are much more likely to be non-union as unions 
have failed to organise in more recently set up workplaces (Machin, 2000, 2003).   
 We set up tests for HRM substitution using repeated cross-section data on 
workplaces from the British Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Surveys. 
These are representative surveys of workplaces (with 25 or more workers) undertaken 
in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998. The cross-time angle offered by the four cross-sections 
is important as we wish to see whether the period of rapid union decline was 
characterised by related patterns of the changing incidence of HRM practices. 
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 The first approach we adopt considers differences over time in the use of 
HRM practices in the union and non-union sector. This enables us to look at whether 
one can identify differential trends through time in HRM incidence between union 
and non-union workplaces. For HRM substitution to be present we ought to see more 
rapid increases in the non-union sector. 
 The second approach acknowledges the potential significance of new 
workplace effects. We consider whether increased HRM incidence in newer 
workplaces as compared to older ones can be identified and, within this, whether there 
are differences between union and non-union sectors. This is a stronger test than the 
first approach as it factors in the observation made above that HRM factors may just 
be more prevalent because they are new. Focusing on differences in newer 
workplaces, relative to the older workplaces, effectively controls for this and so 
should be more informative on the HRM/union substitution hypothesis. Since failure 
to organise in new workplaces also seems key to union decline (Machin, 2000, 2003) 
consideration of this also says something about the importance, or otherwise, of 
increased HRM incidence as an explanatory factor.1 
 Finally we consider longitudinal data on workplaces and industries and 
explore whether the rise of HRM has, in fact, gone hand-in-hand with union decline. 
While some of the data is limited in terms of the number of HRM practices we are 
able to use these data to look at the dynamics of change asking whether one can 
identify whether within-workplace or within-industry changes in unionization display 
any correlation with changes in HRM incidence. We do this in two ways, first asking 
whether unionized workplaces that introduced HRM practices between 1990 and 1998 
                                                           
1 See Pencavel (2002) for a general and wide ranging account of factors underpinning union decline in 
the UK. 
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saw falls in union presence relative to those that did not introduce practices and 
second modelling changes over time in industries between 1980 and 1998. 
 We structure the remainder of the paper into five sections. In section 2 we 
discuss in more detail the hypothesis of HRM/union substitution. In section 3 we 
describe the data, before presenting the evidence on the first approach that we take, 
namely examining union/non-union differences in temporal changes in the incidence 
HRM practices. Section 4 presents results from the analysis based on the second 
approach, looking at union/non-union differences stratified by workplace age. Section 
5 then looks for HR substitution using longitudinal data. Finally, in section 6 we draw 
out some conclusions, reviewing the key findings and also focusing on the 
implications of our results for wider debates within industrial relations.  
  
2.  HRM Substitution 
Increased Incidence of HRM Practices and Unionization 
There is evidence in the UK that demonstrates that the increasing importance within 
management thought attached to HRM has been translated to an increased adoption of 
such practices.  Wood and Albanese (1995: 232-234) showed that the use of an 
extensive range of 15 human resource management practices typically associated with 
high involvement, high commitment or high performance management  – including 
team briefing, team working, formal assessment, merit pay, flexible job descriptions, 
and quality circles – all increased in their sample of 132 UK manufacturing plants 
between 1986 and 1990. Team briefing and flexible job descriptions had the highest 
rate of increase.  
For a similar period in the subsequent decade, a study of manufacturing 
showed that both the uptake by companies and usage within them increased for three 
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key high involvement practices: team working, empowerment and learning culture 
(Wood et al, 2002). Analyses of the UK’s Workplace Employee Relations Survey of 
1998 have also documented the rise of direct communication methods and certain 
kinds of pay systems (Forth and Millward, 2002; Millward, et al, 2000; Sisson, 1993).  
Several more qualitative studies (e.g. Clark, 1995, Scott, 1994, Starkey and 
McKinlay, 1993: 40-81, and Wickens, 1987, for the UK, Rubinstein and Kochan, 
2001) have concentrated on the development of HRM practices in the last two 
decades, Storey’s (1992) being the first to document the freshness of these in key UK 
organisations, while Kochan, et al (1986) and Appelbaum and Batt (1994) did 
likewise for the USA.  
The initial tendency to associate HRM practices with non-unionism was never 
as strong in the UK as it was in the USA, except when they were associated with US 
multinationals. Nonetheless, at least one British commentator, Guest (1989: 48), 
associated HRM with non-unionism when he wrote: ‘An organisation pursuing HRM 
will almost always prefer a non-union path, emphasising individual rather than 
collective arrangements’. Yet while HRM might equate to non-unionism, no-
unionism ‘unfortunately’, Guest noticeably added, could not be equated with HRM, as 
‘a company may pursue non-union policies or remain fortuitously non-union without 
practising HRM’.    
The implication of the adverb ‘fortuitously’ is that HRM is a major, if not the 
only effective, means of remaining non-union.  This is consistent with the way in 
which HRM is inherent to the definition of union substitution in some of the US 
literature, certainly when distinctions are made between it and union suppression. 
Fiorito (2001:335), for example, makes the distinction on the basis that ‘union 
suppression refers to direct attacks on symptoms of “unionism” (pro-union attitudes, 
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intentions or actions) amongst workers’ (author’s italics).   Since union substitution 
refers to positive employer practices concerned with employee involvement it is often 
conceived as being aimed at reducing worker dissatisfaction.  Given that for Fiorito 
the adoption of such practices does not have to be consciously motivated by anti-
unionism, any increase in their use could be taken by definition to be union 
substitution. Nonetheless, this prejudges too much, ahead of empirical research into 
the link between HRM and non-unionism. Fiorito in fact reports just such research, 
which shows that HRM practices may have differential relevance for union 
substitution. 
In the most prominent HRM literature, that which has sought to test its 
performance effects, a wide variety of practices is taken to fall under its umbrella.  
They can be classified as concerned with job and work design (particularly with local 
empowerment), communications and representation, skill acquisition and training, 
appraisal, recruitment and selection, compensation, and internal employment practices 
(Appelbaum et al, 2000, Wood and Wall, 2002).   
Several of the practices that fall under these headings are those which unions 
have campaigned for or which are at least consistent with their demands, the most 
obvious ones being representation, training, fair selection processes, priority given to 
internal recruitment, and job security. Yet this is not to deny that if management were 
to offer these independently of employee pressure, the dissatisfactions that may cause 
unionism may disappear and hence may reduce workers’ willingness to join unions.  
Some practices, and particularly functional flexibility in a situation of negotiated work 
rules and demarcation regulations, may constitute substitutes for union-inspired rules 
and practices.  As such, these may bring their own problems for workers, not least the 
undermining of the union’s power base.   
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The practices that are thought to most directly constitute alternatives to unions 
are those that can replace bargaining and voice roles.  More specifically, there are two 
core substitutes for unions: forms of individualized pay determination such as 
imposed merit and performance-related pay awards or individual bargaining, and 
methods of communication that purport to give workers a direct voice and avoid any 
third party such as a union or at least union representatives. Nonetheless, neither of 
these is likely to offer full alternatives to unions. Firstly, the individualized methods 
mean that individuals are negotiating without the strength of their fellow workers and 
awards may be subject to the arbitrariness of managers, one of the very forces that 
unions were historically set up to counter. Secondly, direct or non-union 
representative communication methods may offer lower levels of involvement, 
information-sharing and consultation rather than bargaining, and may not have the 
formal independence from management that the union has.  However, it is towards 
such forms of pay systems (including those associated with economic involvement 
such as profit-sharing) and voice mechanisms that the argument about union 
substitution has tended to gravitate, and this is mirrored in the empirical testing of the 
link between HRM and unionization.   
 
Existing Empirical Work From Britain 
Existing empirical research on the link between HRM practices and unionism has 
almost exclusively been based on point in time cross-sectional analysis. This is true of 
all the British work we survey here, but is also a feature of the US work in this area.  
Wood (1996), using the full range of practices in his data from UK manufacturing, 
found that both the major HRM practices, and a composite measure of ‘high 
commitment management’ that he developed from them, were not associated with 
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unionism. In fact, both were neither more nor less likely to exist in non-unionized 
workplaces. Appraisal and merit pay were, however, more likely to be used in non-
unionized plants and the rate of change in high commitment management between 
1986 and 1990 was greater in non-union plants.  This suggests unions have a dragging 
effect on HRM’s introduction but ultimately do not reduce its uptake.  It may also be 
indicative of a greater desire on the part of non-unionized managements to implement 
high commitment management, perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid unionism.   
Various analyses of aspects of the Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations 
Survey Series (of 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998) have explored the link between human 
resource management practices and unionism.  Most of those that have concentrated 
on the merit pay and non-union voice mechanisms have concluded that they are not 
associated with non-unionism, being either neutral with respect to union recognition 
or even positively associated with it (Sisson, 1993, Cully et al, 2000, Gospel and 
Willman, 2003).    
Wood and de Menezes (1998) developed a composite measure of high 
commitment management based on a mixture of data from WIRS for 1990 and a sister 
survey from 1990-91 (the Employers’ Manpower and Skills Practices Survey) and 
found no association with unionism.  Analysis of a fuller range of HRM practices that 
appeared for the first time in the WIRS/WERS series in 1998 found that the number 
of these practices used was associated with unionism (Cully et al, 2000: 110-111), but 
that this was mostly because they were more widespread in large private-sector 
workplaces and throughout the public sector.  A more in-depth analysis of the 
practices that was included in Cully et al’s aggregate index of high commitment by 
Wood, de Menezes and Lasaosa (2003) revealed that the relationship was more 
complex. The family-friendly practices, for example, and internal labor market 
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employment practices included in their index were not associated with core high 
involvement practices associated with changes in work organisation. This does 
question the validity of indices based on simply aggregating practices.  Using their 
superior measures, Wood et al (2003) found no strong relationship between union 
recognition or density and high involvement management (and indeed, nor family-
friendly management).   
Forth and Millward (2002) conducted a more direct assessment of the union 
substitution hypothesis, but only using cross sectional data (the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey). They tested to see if direct communication channels 
were more prevalent where managers reported that they were generally not in favour 
of union membership than where managers were either neutral or positive towards 
unions. Forth and Millward first examined the subsample of workplaces with union 
recognition and then the non-union subsample, and found that direct communication 
was unrelated to management’s orientation towards unionism in the unionized 
sample.  In the unionized sample the existence of some direct communication 
channels is related to negative attitudes towards unions on the part of management, 
but the extent of their usage is greater where these attitudes are positive.  Forth and 
Millward (2002: 23) conclude that non-union firms attempting union substitution 
provide the minimum necessary and ‘do not provide further channels of 
communication that might be superfluous to the aim of union avoidance’.  
 
Interpretation 
 
The dominant finding of co-existence between HRM and unions may, however, 
reflect a variety of processes. Firstly, those who associate HRM with non-unionism 
may see the relationship simply as a transitional state or aberration.  For example, 
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Guest by 1995 was readily prepared to admit the co-existence of unionism and HRM, 
but implied that this could reflect that one or other were in weak forms. Either the 
trade unionism was not robust or the HRM was fragmented or limited (Guest, 1995: 
121). Moreover, the statistical results would be mirroring to some extent the rise of 
industrial relations situations where neither HRM nor unionism existed (the black 
hole of Guest, 1995: 125-127, or Sissons’ bleak house, 1993: 207). According to 
Guest, HRM could not exist at high levels of unionization.  The case of a mutually 
supportive relationship between the unions and HRM (what we might associate with 
Kochan and Osterman’s mutual gains model or the currently vogue term partnership) 
was seen by Guest in 1995 as less likely than ‘black holes’ or ‘bleak houses’.  The 
viability of the mutual gains model is certainly dependent on a change of union 
attitudes so that they embrace the HRM model.  This implies that they accept a role in 
enhancing economic performance on the basis that the assumed HRM-performance 
link is proven.  Subsequently, Guest and Conway (1999) observed high HRM to be 
associated with higher levels of job satisfaction, commitment and leaving intentions, 
regardless of the union status of the individual.  Nonetheless, those employees in 
unionized workplaces with low HRM had more negative attitudes than low-HRM 
workplaces with no union (i.e. those in his black hole) 
Secondly, and linked to this, there is the possibility that the cross-sectional 
analysis may mask multiple processes.  There may be cases where HRM and 
unionism are mutually supportive as seemingly in the original Saturn experiment in 
the US (Rubinstein and Kochan, 2001); cases where managements are using it to 
undermine the union; and cases where it is being used to keep unions at bay, 
alongside the black hole cases. There may also be a compartmentalisation of the 
major HRM practices from unionism, with the focus of the former on changing tasks 
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systems, the latter on governance. This being the case, the key test remains between 
systems that replace collective bargaining and union voice.  
This emphasis on the dynamic nature of the HRM substitution hypothesis 
suggests that one may end up with misleading findings from point in time cross-
sectional analysis. The complex position that may underlie the dominant co-existence-
of-HRM-and-unionism result could be explored further by more sophisticated 
analysis that differentiates more clearly between different unionized situations. Some 
have done this to an extent by taking into account union density as a measure of union 
strength (Wood, 1996). It could also differentiate between the motives of 
management, and treat them as influencing the outcome of HRM. For example, Koys 
(1991) found that perceptions of the fairness of management’s motives in using HRM 
practices influenced their effect on organisational commitment.  
Equally the issue of substitutability could usefully be explored with data over 
time as is seemingly required by the dynamic processes associated with HRM 
adoption. Fiorito (2001: 351) himself admits after presenting his own cross sectional 
data at the individual level that we require measures of ‘the use of HR practices over 
time’ to really assess ‘the extent to which they have contributed to the decline of 
unions over recent decades’. It is this cross-time approach emphasising dynamics that 
we adopt in our empirical investigation. 
 
3.  Union/Non-Union Differences in HRM Incidence Over Time 
Data Description 
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The data used in this paper is drawn from the British Workplace Industrial/Employee 
Relations Surveys of 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998. These are workplace-level surveys2 
with rich data on the industrial relations environment of workplaces that have been 
widely used by researchers to study a range of issues (see the bibliography of 
Millward, 2002, for details of these studies). Of most relevance for our analysis is the 
fact that the surveys were carried out over time as this permits us to address the 
question of whether HRM uptake has paralleled union decline. The survey data 
contain a number of measures of union presence and of HRM practices, which we 
describe next. 
 
Measures of Union Presence and HRM  
The union data in the WIRS/WERS series have been used by many researchers, both 
to look at union decline (Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1994, 1995, Machin, 2000, 
2003) and to study the economic effects of trade unions (Millward et al, 2002). The 
usual measure on which researchers focus is trade union recognition, namely whether 
management recognises trade unions for collective bargaining purposes, but there is 
also data on workplace-level union density (the proportion of workers who are union 
members) and union coverage (the proportion of workers paid by collective 
bargaining contracts). As is illustrated below, all measures show sharp falls in union 
presence between 1980 and 1998. 
The data are also rich on HRM variables, although coverage has become 
broader over time so that the 1998 survey covered most areas associated with HRM. 
Fortunately for our present concerns, the variables that have been included throughout 
the series (or in at least three surveys) relate to pay methods or employee voice, which 
                                                           
2 The first three surveys were representative samples of establishments with at least 25 employees, 
whilst the 1998 survey lowered this size threshold to 10 employees. To maintain consistency over time 
 14
are at the core of the HRM literature. For our empirical analysis we have therefore 
identified the following variables that we can observe over time (with years available 
on a consistently defined basis in square brackets):  
- the incidence of flexible pay (profit sharing or share ownership) [1984, 1990, 1998, 
trading sector workplaces only];  
- the presence of a Joint Consultative Committee [1980, 1984, 1990, 1998]; 
- the presence of problem solving groups [1990, 1998]; 
- whether team briefings occur [1984, 1990, 1998]; 
- whether there are regular managements with senior management [1984, 1990, 
1998]; 
- whether a management chain is present [1984, 1990, 1998]; 
- whether a suggestions scheme is in operation [1984, 1990, 1998]; 
- whether the workplace has a personnel specialist in place [1980, 1984, 1990, 1998]. 
Descriptive Statistics 
As a starting point it is worth re-iterating the scale of union decline in Britain. The 
time series pattern of unionization, in particular the decline after 1979, is well known.  
Aggregate union density showed a remarkable stability in the post-war period (at 
around 40-45 percent membership), followed by a sharp rise in the 1970s, but then an 
even sharper fall from the late 1970s onwards.  After 1979 aggregate union density 
has trended downwards so that, by the end of the 1990s, less than 30 percent of the 
workforce was a member of trade unions.3 
Sharp union decline is also revealed in the WIRS/WERS data since 1980. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the percentage of establishments that recognised trade 
                                                                                                                                                                          
analysis is restricted to workplaces with at least 25 employees. 
3  For selected years aggregate union density (in percent) was as follows: 1946 – 43; 1950 – 41; 1960 – 
41; 1970 – 46; 1975 – 51; 1980 – 52; 1985 – 46; 1990 – 38; 1995 – 32; 1999 – 28.  Sources for these 
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unions for collective bargaining fell from 64 to 42 percent between 1980 and 1998. 
Union density and coverage also fell sharply (to 36 percent for density, and 41 percent 
for coverage) over the same time period.4 
Panel B of Table 1 gives means of the HRM variables over the relevant cross-
sections. For most HRM practices the Table shows increased incidence - particularly 
flexible pay, team briefing and having a personnel specialist - although this is not true 
of all measures. The presence of the more traditional Joint Consultative Committee 
actually falls and the frequency of some of the others (regular meetings with senior 
management, presence of a management chain) remain fairly constant over time.  
 
Changes Over Time by Union Status 
Table 2 shows the difference in the incidence of HRM practices and how they have 
changed through time separately for union and non-union workplaces. The Table 
shows the percent of workplaces with each of the practices for a start and end year, 
and shows changes for each sector over time. The final column gives differences in 
these sector-specific changes as non-union/union gaps. 
 The numbers in the Table reveal several patterns. First, at a given point in 
time, the incidence of the HRM factors tends to be higher in the union, as compared to 
the non-union, sector. At face value this would suggest a complementarity between 
unions and HRM practices (as in Kochan and Osterman, 1995). However, it is any 
changes through time, during the period of union decline that are of most interest to 
us. On this the Table shows an increased uptake of most practices in both sectors, but 
the results concerning increased substitution into the non-union sector are uneven (see 
                                                                                                                                                                          
numbers are Price and Bain (1983), Waddington (1992), Cully and Woodland (1998), and own 
calculations from the 1999 (Autumn) Labour Force Survey. 
4 Note that the 1980 number for density is based only upon full-time workers (see Millward, Bryson 
and Forth, 2000). 
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final column).  Indeed, the only factor that seems to show a strong faster differential 
increase in incidence in non-union workplaces vis-à-vis union workplaces is flexible 
pay. There is has been an 8 percent faster increase in flexible pay incidence in the 
non-union sector. But this really is the only evidence of substitution. The next nearest 
is a 4 percent increase in Joint Consultative Committees, but the remainder show very 
similar patterns of change in non-union and union sectors (in the +2 to –3 percent 
range of differences). 
 
 
4. HRM Substitution and Age of Workplace 
Links With Age of Workplace 
The evidence so far has not revealed evidence of HRM substitution. In this section we 
consider the question another way, looking instead at the extent to which newer 
workplaces have differentially introduced HRM practices. We adopt this approach in 
the light of the evidence that union decline in Britain has been, at least partially, 
driven by a failure of unions to secure recognition and build up membership in newer 
workplaces. Consider the upper panel of Table 3. This shows that 63 percent of 
workplaces set up before 1980 recognised unions for collective bargaining. Union 
membership density was 58 percent in these older workplaces. Considering 
workplaces set up in the period of union decline tells a very different story. Union 
recognition is 36 percent in workplaces set up in the 1980s and only 27 percent in 
those set up in the 1990s. Union density is 31 and 22 percent respectively. Hence one 
sees very sharp falls in unionization rates by age of workplace. Columns (6) and (7) of 
the Table show the scale of the declines, and that they are very strong in statistical 
terms (the numbers in brackets being standard errors). 
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 This therefore looks like prime territory to try and identify HRM substitution. 
If new workplaces the absence of unions may well mean that workers want some 
alternative form of voice. If so we should see more rapid inflows of HRM practices 
into newer workplaces, especially as compared to older, more unionized workplaces. 
This is what we first look at in the lower panel of Table 3, which has the same 
structure as for the indicators of union presence, but now for the HRM practices. 
 The numbers in the Table show something of a mixed pattern, but they are in 
parts conducive to the idea that HRM practices are more likely to be present in newer 
workplaces. The strongest evidence in favour of this is for flexible pay and for the 
presence of a personnel specialist. Flexible pay is 8 percent (set up in the 1980s) and 
10 percent (set up in the 1990s) higher in newer workplaces. Corresponding numbers 
for presence of a personnel specialist are 10 and 16 percent higher respectively. Age 
of workplace gaps are less marked for some of the other measures, but most are 
positive, the main exception being the more traditional practice, the Joint Consultative 
Committee. 
However, over the time period being studied there have also been some 
important compositional changes, such as the increased incidence of smaller 
workplaces, and the move away from manufacturing to services. So we next present 
some empirical estimates of the relationship with age of workplace derived from 
statistical models that control for such shifts in composition. This is important 
because some of these HRM practices may be much more likely to be prevalent in 
certain workplaces. For example, larger workplaces are more likely to have a 
personnel specialist than are their smaller counterparts. 
 
Statistical Estimates 
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Table 4 reports estimates of the workplace-age correlations from statistical models. 
Like the previous Table we begin, in the upper panel, by presenting evidence on union 
decline and workplace age conditional on the characteristics entered to control for 
compositional change. The lower panel presents analogous models for the HRM 
practices. The choice of control variables was made on the basis of a judgement of 
what are likely to have been the most important compositional changes in the 
economy over the time period under study. The variables included are: establishment 
size (five dummy variables compared to a base of 25-49 workers), whether the 
establishment was single-site, the proportion of part-time and female workers, 
whether the workplace is in the private sector and a set of one-digit industry dummies. 
 The upper panel of the Table reconfirms what is known from earlier work, 
revealing union recognition to be around -.10 to -.12 points lower in workplaces set 
up in the 1980s or 1990s conditional on the factors measuring compositional change. 
This is a sizeable effect and shows why many commentators now emphasise the role 
played by new workplaces in contributing to union decline. The same is true of union 
density, as given in the second specification of the upper panel, where 1980s and 
1990s effects are very similar indeed. 
 The lower panel of the Table considers the HRM practices. It is immediately 
striking that the inclusion of the controls is much more important for the HR 
regressions than for the union ones. In statistical terms all of the correlations with 
workplace age are wiped out in the statistical models. Unlike for union decline, the 
changing composition of workplaces seems to fully explain the link between the 
incidence of HRM practices and workplace age. This, like the evidence of the 
previous section does not seem in line with HRM substitution taking place during the 
period of union decline in Britain. 
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Non-Union/Union Differences 
Before coming to this conclusion, however, one should note that we have not looked, 
as substitution would predict, at whether it is predominantly new non-union 
workplaces that are increasingly introducing HRM practices. We therefore do this in 
Table 5 which considers separate age of workplace effects from statistical models for 
union and non-union workplaces and which looks at the gap between the two. HRM 
substitution related to age of workplace predicts that one should see more of a positive 
new workplace effect in non-union workplaces. The Table therefore presents (in 
columns (3) and (4)) coefficient estimates associated with indictors of whether 
workplaces were set up in the 1980s and 1990s for the union sector, analogous effects 
for the non-union sector (in columns (5) and (6)) and then non-union/union gaps in 
columns (7) and (8).  
 Table 5 shows non-union/union gaps to be rarely positive, as HRM 
substitution would predict. In fact none of the non-union/union differences in columns 
(7) and (8) are significantly positive and many are actually negative. This reflects that 
a number of the non-union effects are negative and they rarely are more positive than 
the union effects. None of this supports the HRM/union substitution thesis. 
 
5. Longitudinal Changes in the Union-HRM Relation 
Our analysis so far rejects the idea that HRM substitution, in its orthodox sense of 
substituting between union and non-union sectors, has occurred. But one more 
possibility remains:  that where the use of HRM has risen within the union sector, it 
could have weakened unions. This would represent a form of HRM substitution 
occurring within the union sector. 
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We investigate this hypothesis by drawing upon the longitudinal sample of 
workplaces that the WIRS/WERS series looked at between 1990 and 1997. We are 
somewhat limited in the HRM variables we can look at here and, due to the nature of 
the available data, look only at the JCC and Flexible Pay measures. Table 6 shows the 
within-establishment change in union density broken down by whether a HRM 
practice was introduced, removed or there is no change between 1990 and 1997. The 
hypothesis that HRM substitution weakened unions within the union sector would 
correspond to larger falls in union density in workplaces that introduced an HRM 
practice.  
The results in Table 6 are not in line with this view.  For example, workplaces 
that introduced a JCC between 1990 and 1997 saw union density fall by 9 percent. At 
first glance one might think of this as union replacement. However, density also fell 
by 9 percent in workplaces that removed a JCC and by 6 percent in workplaces where 
JCC status remained unaltered. The same pattern is true of Flexible Pay. While 
density fell by 9 percent in workplaces that introduced Flexible Pay, it fell by 10 
percent in those that got rid of the practice and by 6 percent in workplaces where no 
change occurred. 
The results remain robust to controlling for 1990 to 1997 changes in 
log(employment), in the proportion manual workers and a set of one-digit industry 
dummies, as shown in Table 7. Overall there seems to be little evidence of faster 
union decline in workplaces that introduced HRM practices in the 1990s. 
Another way of using the WIRS/WERS data to study longitudinal changes is 
to aggregate the workplace data in the four surveys of 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998 to 
industry-level so as to study industry-level changes in the relationship between 
unionization and HRM incidence over time. We carry out this exercise in Table 8 
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where we have aggregated the data to 44 industries that we track over time. The Table 
shows regression coefficients from a regression of the proportion of workplaces in the 
industry with recognised unions on the HRM practice, including industry fixed 
effects. One can interpret these regressions as modelling the change in unionization as 
a function of the change in HRM practices at industry-level. They therefore pose the 
following question about HRM substitution: in industries where HRM incidence went 
up by more did unionization fall by more? To find evidence in line with this one 
would expect a negative coefficient on the HRM measures in the industry fixed 
effects specifications reported in the Table. 
Table 8 is structured to show results that enter the HRM incidence measures 
separately (in columns (1) through (7) where no controls are included and columns (9) 
through (15) where controls are included) and all together (in column (8) without 
controls and column (16) with controls). The pattern of results is interesting. While 
there are a few negative coefficients, these are the exception to the rule, and even here 
only one of these is statistically significant (for Regular Meetings with Senior 
Management when no regression controls are entered in column (4)). In the 
specifications with controls in the lower panel of the Table there is absolutely no 
evidence of union decline being more prevalent where HRM incidence increased by 
more. As such, both sets of longitudinal data considered in this section are not in line 
with the hypothesis of HRM substitution. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we consider one of the key hypotheses of modern industrial relations, 
namely that unionism has been replaced by alternative non-union forms of voice and 
communication through the adoption of HRM practices. Were such HRM substitution 
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taking place, then one should see more rapid introduction of HRM practices in non-
union workplaces, or certainly that the new kinds of workplaces being set up in recent 
years should be characterised by these practices and not by unionization. 
 Our empirical investigation of the HRM/union substitution hypothesis, using 
workplace data from the Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations series of surveys 
in Britain between 1980 and 1998,. found no evidence to support the hypothesis of 
HRM/union substitution, at least operating in the commonly accepted and frequently 
stated way of HRM replacing unions. This is from several approaches. First we 
compared changes over time in the incidence of HRM practices across union and non-
union sectors, finding little difference occurring between sectors. Second, we asked 
whether newer workplaces (strongly shown by other studies as more likely to be non-
union) have experienced differentially faster HRM incidence and we are unable to 
find much evidence in support of this, and certainly no evidence of significant 
union/non-union gaps. Third, longitudinal changes also failed to find any evidence of 
faster union decline in workplaces or industries with faster take up of HRM practices.  
Overall, one cannot conclude anything other than saying HRM substitution does not 
seem to be a very important factor in explaining trade union decline. 
 The study  does though have strong implications for the wider debate in 
industrial relations. If new work practices of the sort that we have considered are 
actually no less likely to be introduced in the union sector then this does question 
some of the discussion surrounding the future of industrial relations as a field of study 
that has been premised on HRM and unionism as alternatives.  In fact it may be more 
the case that HRM may be as complementary to the organization of work in unionized 
workplaces as it is elsewhere.  Critical to this is another subject we have not 
considered here, namely the impact of HRM introduction on workplace performance, 
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which is a difficult area fraught with questions to do with the direction of causation. 
Addressing this, together with its connection to the possibly different reasons for 
introducing practices in union and non-union environments, remains firmly on the 
agenda for future research. 
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Table 1: Changes in Union Presence and the  
Incidence of HRM Practices Over Time (Proportions) 
 
 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 
A. Union Variables 
Union Recognition .64 .66 .53 .42 
Union Density£ .62 .58 .48 .36 
Union Coverage - .71 .54 .41 
B. HRM Variables 
Flexible Pay - .30 .54 .50 
Joint Consultative Committee .34 .34 .29 .29 
Problem Solving Groups - - .35 .42 
Team Briefing - .36 .48 .53 
Regular Meetings With Senior 
Management 
- .34 .41 .37 
Management Chain - .62 .60 .60 
Suggestion Schemes - .25 .28 .33 
Personnel Specialist .19 .20 .27 .27 
 
 
Notes:  
Aggregate (i.e. all establishments with 25 or more workers) weighted proportions in panel A taken from the 
sourcebooks for the 1980, 1984 and 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Surveys (1980: Daniel and Millward, 1983; 1984:  Millward and Stevens, 1986; 1990: 
Millward et al., 1992; 1998: Cully at al., 1998, 1999). 1998 recognition data recodes recognition to zero for fifteen 
workplaces which recognised teacher unions but who in fact had pay set by the Pay Review Bodies (this follows 
the same procedure as in Chapter 10 of Cully at al., 1999). The serial codes for these fifteen workplaces were 
kindly provided by John Forth and Neil Millward.  
£ denotes that union density is for full-timers in 1980 and all workers in other years 
Panel B weighted proportions are own calculations from the WIRS/WERS data. 
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Table 2: Union/Non-Union Differences in Changes  
in the Incidence of HRM Practices Over Time (Proportions) 
 
 
  Union Sector Non-Union Sector Difference 
Between Sectors 
 Start 
and 
End 
Year 
Percent 
in Start 
Year 
Percent 
in End 
Year 
Change Percent 
in Start 
Year 
Percent 
in End 
Year 
Change Difference in 
Change Between 
Non-Union/Union 
Sector 
Flexible Pay 1984 
1998 
.38 .55 .17 .23 .48 .25 .08 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
1980 
1998 
.41 .38 -.03 .21 .22 .01 .04 
Problem 
Solving 
Groups 
1990 
1998 
.39 .49 .10 .30 .37 .07 -.03 
Team Briefing 1984 
1998 
.39 .58 .19 
 
.31 .49 .18 -.01 
Regular 
Meetings With 
Senior 
Management 
1984 
1998 
.36 .41 .05 .30 .35 .05 .00 
Management 
Chain 
1984 
1998 
.68 .70 .02 .51 .52 .01 -.01 
Suggestion 
Schemes 
1984 
1998 
.31 .42 .11 .15 .26 .11 .00 
Personnel 
Specialist 
1980 
1998 
.23 .32 .09 .12 .23 .11 .02 
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Table 3: Changes in Union Status and in the Incidence of HRM Practices  
Over Time Related to Age of Workplace 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years of Data Measure Set up 
Before 
1980 
Set up 
in 1980s 
Set up 
in 1990s 
Gap 1980s 
– Before 
1980 
(4) – (3) 
Gap 1990s 
– Before 
1980 
(5) – (3) 
Number of 
Workplaces 
A. Differences in Union  
Status by Age of Workplace 
1980, 1984, 1990, 
1998 
Union 
Recognition 
.63 .36 .27 -.27 (.02) -.36 (.02) 8022 
1980, 1984, 1990, 
1998 
Union density .58 .31 .22 -.27 (.01) -.36 (.02) 7028 
B. Differences in HRM  
Incidence by Age of Workplace 
1980, 1984, 1990, 
1998 
JCC .33 .24 .26 -.09 (.01) -.07(.02) 8004 
1984, 1990, 1998 
Trading Sector 
Flexible Pay .42 .50 .52 .08 (.02) .10 (.02) 4194 
1990, 1998 Problem-Solving 
Groups 
.39 .38 .37 -.01 (.02) -.02 (.02) 3955 
1984, 1990, 1998 Team Briefing .45 .46 .50 .01 (.02) .05 (.02) 5961 
1984, 1990, 1998 Regular 
Meetings with 
Senior 
Management 
.36 .40 .42 .05 (.02) .07 (.02) 5978 
1984, 1990, 1998 Management 
Chain 
.61 .63 .53 .02 (.02) -.07 (.02) 5978 
1984, 1990, 1998 Suggestion 
Schemes 
.28 .29 .32 .01 (.01) .04 (.02) 5977 
1980, 1984, 1990, 
1998 
Personnel 
Specialist 
.32 .42 .48 .10 (.02) .16 (.02) 4194 
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Table 4: Statistical Estimates of the relationship Between Changes in Union 
Status and the Incidence of HRM Practices Over Time and Age of Workplace 
 
 
 
 
Years of Data Measure Set up in 1980s Set up in 1990s Sample size 
A. Union Equations 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 Union 
Recognition 
-.120  
(.019) 
-.100  
(.026) 
7483 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 Union Density -.102  
(.011) 
-.106 
(.016) 
6623 
B. HRM Equations 
1984, 1990, 1998 
Trading Sector 
Flexible Pay .003 
(.024) 
-.024 
(.033) 
3915 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 JCC -.052  
(.021) 
-.019  
(.028) 
7466 
1990, 1998 Problem-
Solving Groups 
.000  
(.021) 
-.010  
(.027) 
3640 
1984, 1990, 1998 Team Briefing -.003  
(.020) 
.011  
(.027) 
5480 
1984, 1990, 1998 Regular 
Meetings with 
Senior 
Management 
-.003  
(.019) 
.046  
(.027) 
5497 
1984, 1990, 1998 Management 
Chain 
.001  
(.018) 
-.013  
(.025) 
5497 
1984, 1990, 1998 Suggestion 
Schemes 
-.020  
(.019) 
-.008  
(.027) 
5496 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 Personnel 
Specialist 
-.010 
(.022) 
.004 
(.030) 
7483 
 
Notes: probit marginal effects, standard errors in brackets; all specifications include controls for 
establishment size (dummies for 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999, 1000+ workers relative to 25-49), 
female proportion , part-time proportion, private sector, one-digit industry dummies and survey year 
dummies. 
 31
 
Table 5: Differences in Age of Workplace Effects by Union Status From 
Statistical Models of the Incidence of HRM Practices  
 
 
 
 
  Union 
Workplace 
Non-Union 
Workplace 
Non-Union/Union 
Difference 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Years of 
Data 
Measure Set up 
in 
1980s 
Set up 
in 
1990s 
Set up 
in 1980s 
Set up 
in 
1990s 
Set up 
in 1980s 
(5) – (3) 
Set up in 
1990s 
(6) – (4) 
Sample 
size 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Trading 
Sector 
Flexible Pay -.009 
(.037) 
.057 
(.052) 
.020 
(.031) 
-.053 
(.040) 
.029 
(.047) 
-.110 
(.061) 
3915 
1980, 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
JCC -.018 
(.027) 
-.000 
(.037) 
-.074 
(.030) 
-.025 
(.039) 
-.056 
(.039) 
-.025 
(.050) 
7466 
1990, 1998 Problem-Solving 
Groups 
.028 
(.029) 
.036 
(.037) 
-.022 
(.031) 
-.050 
(.037) 
-.049 
(.042) 
-.084 
(.048) 
3640 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Team Briefing -.008 
(.027) 
.041 
(.037) 
.022 
(.029) 
.004 
(.037) 
.030 
(.038) 
-.036 
(.049) 
5480 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Regular Meetings 
with Senior 
Management 
-.017 
(.026) 
.011 
(.036) 
.022 
(.028) 
.089 
(.037) 
.039 
(.038) 
.077 
(.048) 
5497 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Management Chain -.015 
(.025) 
.032 
(.033) 
.034 
(.023) 
-.029 
(.033) 
.048 
(.031) 
-.061 
(.048) 
5497 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Suggestion Schemes -.019 
(.025) 
-.014 
(.034) 
.019 
(.030) 
.032 
(.037) 
.039 
(.039) 
.046 
(.049) 
5496 
1980, 
1984, 
1990, 1998 
Personnel Specialist .010 
(.029) 
.040 
(.039) 
-.013 
(.031) 
-.018 
(.040) 
-.022 
(.041) 
-.057 
(.051) 
7483 
 
Notes: probit marginal effects, standard errors in brackets; all specifications include controls for 
establishment size (dummies for 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999, 1000+ workers relative to 25-49), 
female proportion , part-time proportion, private sector, one-digit industry dummies and survey year 
dummies. 
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Table 6: Changes in Union Density (%) and HRM Introduction 
in Unionized Workplaces, 1990-97  
 
 
 
 Introduced Practice Removed Practice No change 
Flexible Pay -8.9 -9.6 -5.8 
Number of 
workplaces 
87 42 319 
JCC -8.6 -8.8 -5.8 
Number of 
workplaces 
80 64 307 
 
Notes:  own calculations from 1990-97 WIRS panel.  Sample covers workplaces that recognised trade 
unions for collective bargaining purposes in 1990 and 1997. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Statistical Models Relating Changes in Union Density and HRM 
Introduction in Unionized Workplaces, 1990-97  
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Changes in Proportion Union Members, 1990-97 
 Introduced Practice Removed Practice Sample Size 
Flexible pay -.008 (.025) -.017 (.034) 444 
JCC -.026 (.027) -.042 (.025) 451 
 
Notes:  all specifications include controls for change in log(employment), change in proportion manual 
and a set of one-digit industry dummies; standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 8: Industry Panel (44 Industries) Relating Changes in Union Recognition 
to Changes in HRM Practices, 1980-98  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Flexible Pay .105 
(.070) 
      .042 
(.069) 
JCC  .077 
(.092) 
     -.007 
(.095) 
Team Briefing   .219 
(.081) 
    .061 
(.090) 
Regular Meetings 
with Senior 
Management 
   -.166 
(.088) 
   -.151 
(.078) 
Management Chain     .160 
(.096) 
  .048 
(.095) 
Suggestion Schemes      .166 
(.106) 
 .003 
(.094) 
Personnel Specialist       .355 
(.061) 
.291 
(.081) 
Controls No No No No No No No No 
R-Squared .87 .90 .91 .91 .91 .91 .89 .93 
Sample Size 176 130 132 132 132 132 176 130 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Flexible Pay .097 
(.082) 
      .103 
(.072) 
JCC  -.057 
(.091) 
     -.160 
(.122) 
Team Briefing   .193 
(.089) 
    .102 
(.085) 
Regular Meetings 
with Senior 
Management 
   -.068 
(.092) 
   -.057 
(.085) 
Management Chain     .057 
(.103) 
  -.028 
(.112) 
Suggestion Schemes      .146 
(.099) 
 .022 
(.105) 
Personnel Specialist       .264 
(.056) 
.261 
(.094) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared .91 .92 .93 .93 .93 .93 .91 .94 
Sample Size 176 130 132 132 132 132 176 130 
 
Notes: based upon aggregating the 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998 WIRS/WERS establishment data to 
industry level; weighted by industry cell sizes; standard errors in parentheses. 
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